According to John Rawls, justice is the first virtue of institutions just as truth is the first issue of systems of thought. (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice) Subsequently, his conception of political morality is based on a highly abstract state of nature in which free and rational delegates devise the basic rules that will govern society from behind a veil of ignorance. This veil, important because it denies all participants all knowledge of their future gender, race, social status, wealth, as well as what will make them happy, forces the delegates to endorse policies that may possibly favor other individuals over themselves, and thereby benefit the whole of society. So, based on a maximin principle, the delegates, in pursuing their own advantage, end up pursuing the advantage of all. They choose this option, since the non-maximin options have possible outcomes that are disastrous and significantly worse then the guaranteed level of the maximin choice, and, more importantly, because the worst possible outcome of the maximin option is satisfactory to everyone. Subsequently, it is Rawls’ belief that this deliberation would undeniably lead the delegates to choose his two principles of justice, which provide for equal basic liberty and fair equality of opportunity. The latter principle dictates that social goods be arranged so that they are to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged, and attached to offices/positions that are open to all.

Rawls thought experiment, and the argument that society should accept this notion of justice as fairness, is forwarded in his concept of the original position. The original position is not an historical state of affairs, but rather a hypothetical situation in which the participants are rational and disinterested thinkers. As such, the deliberators are not trying to ensure an outcome that meets an already existing standard of justice, but rather are aiming for a universal acceptance of an agreed upon point of view. Consequently, this poses a question: If Socrates, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Locke, and Kant were deliberators in the original position, what kind of government would they derive? And, more importantly, how would their own conceptions of justice be ranked as possible alternatives to Rawls?

In order to answer these questions we must first expound on the ideology behind each individual philosopher’s political utopia, and decide whether Rawls viewpoint can be upheld to their scrutiny or surpass their ethical worth. In Plato’s Republic, we address the conflicting viewpoints of Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Socrates. Ultimately for Plato, justice is deemed as an isomorphic entity that exists between the person and the city-state, and in which, a just city-state is indubitably comprised of just individuals. In Locke we derive a commonwealth based on the laws of nature accepted and endorsed by the express consent of its citizens. With Kant we consider a society that is a kingdom of ends created through an obligation to moral duty and derived via practical reason. But, what does this all mean?

In The Republic, the first notion of justice as defined by Thrasymachus, is that might makes right. In other words, the outcome of all political conflicts between the strong and the weak end up with the strong winning, enacting laws to their advantage, and calling these laws just. Encompassed in this definition is the assertion that justice is a vice, not a virtue, and that, implicitly, it is the unjust man who is the happiest. Why? Because the unjust man who is never caught can unremittingly enjoy the fruits of his unjustness, while the just man must ultimately pay the price. Yet, according to Socrates, this is an improbable and flawed measure of justice since rulers, as all humans, are fallible and often make mistakes. Subsequently, the rulers can force its subjects to inadvertently endorse laws that are ultimately not to the advantage of the stronger party. By logically undermining Thrasymachus’ argument, Socrates convinces him, that justice is never accurately determined by the domination of the stronger party over the weak.

So, how does this fit into Rawls’ conception of justice? Well, clearly Rawls would agree with Socrates that this is neither a defendable, nor workable definition of justice. No party in the original position would ever agree to this structure since there would be no guarantee that you would be a member of the stronger party once the veil of ignorance was removed. Additionally, this characterization does nothing to satisfy Rawls difference principle, since there would remain a large group of disadvantaged individuals in the weaker party. Beyond this, the largest problem is that Thrasymachus’ notion does not extend basic equal liberty to all citizens. Consequently, since, according to Rawls undeserved inequalities at the social starting positions deserve to be redressed and not dominated, we must rank Thrasymachus conception of justice as the least just alternative to Rawls, and an unfeasible outcome of the original position.

Our next analysis of justice, as presented by Glaucon in The Republic, is somewhat closer to Rawls since it involves the development of a social contract based upon deliberation, universal agreement, and benefits to all. Glaucon’s rational resolution, which arises from a state of nature, however, is based on the fear of reprisal and the need for security, not on what is inherently fair. As such, for Glaucon, the outcome of negotiation is an agreement in which one party gives up the right to harm another in exchange for not being harmed themselves. For Rawls it is correcting the properly aggregated and generalized social starting places that are inherently unfair and undeserved. As such, the motivations that each theory utilizes in discovering justice are markedly different. So, although Glaucon might make greater headway than Thrasymachus while negotiating in the original position, his perception would eventually be usurped by Rawls two superior principles.

Next, in The Republic, Socrates maintains that no one is just unless they are serving the commonwealth by performing their optimal function as dictated by inborn talent. Additionally, justice only occurs when all parts of the individual and state are performing their optimal isomorphic functions, based on reason, spirit, or appetite. Since this optimal function is not a matter of choice however, it lies in stark contrast to Rawls theory of basic equal liberty. Why? Because it undermines both an individual’s free will as well as the concept of fair equality of opportunity. Clearly, it is impossible to have these principles satisfied if your life is predetermined by another’s analysis of you. Furthermore, Socrates plan does not allow for all posts and positions that confer superior advantage to be open to all applicants, since in order to be considered as a member of the ruling class, one must be an elite philosopher king. It follows that if one is not envisioned as possessing a superior reasoning ability, than one can never step into a post or position of authority, regardless of merit and educational achievement. Yet, to be fair, a slight similarity does exist between Socrates and Rawls’ concept of formal equality of justice. This principle, which doesn’t go as far as fair equality of opportunity, asserts that one can be opposed to caste hierarchy without being opposed to hierarchy itself, since it allows for inequality to exist when the natural ability and extra effort of one are unequal to that of another. As such, formal equality of opportunity offers the individual the equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind, if duly motivated and capable. Additionally, since this notion is contained within the structure of the difference principle, the less advantaged can view this discrepancy as a social asset utilized for the common advantage. Where Rawls differs from Socrates, however, is in how we allow for these formal inequalities to exist in society. Although they both believe that a relationship between ability and burden exists, Socrates thinks that the relationship has nothing at all to do with merit. Consequently, for Socrates the ideal city-state is a closed society, and for Rawls the political social order is open. So, the question remains, as a negotiator in the original position, how would Socrates fair? Although he would get further than Thrasymachus, he would not do as well as Glaucon.

Our next candidate, John Locke, is much closer to a Rawlsian conception of justice than any figure we have thus far discussed in Plato’s The Republic. Since Locke’s rendition of the state of nature encompasses a full-blown moral state in which individuals bear external obligation, there is an air of equality, independence, and freedom. Hence, as an outcropping of this, Locke believes that under the laws of nature, all persons have a duty to not harm each other in their life, health, liberty, and possessions. Locke states, “And that all men be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind…” (Locke, Second Treatise of Government) This is thus far consistent with Rawls posited position of justice as fairness. However, Locke eventually determines that an inconvenience to all of this freedom is the potential onslaught of war, since it is each individual, and not the universal rule of law that determines when an individual has been harmed. This pronouncement ultimately provides the impetus for entering into a social contract and the formal creation of government. So, as such, if Locke were a negotiator in the original position, the question is, would his ideology go far enough to insure justice?

As a representative, Locke would readily agree to the first principle of justice- that of equal basic liberty. Furthermore, he would be a willing participant behind the veil of ignorance since he feels that people, as morally free individuals in the state of nature, must consent to the curtailment of freedom in order for the state to be legitimized. Additionally, he would willingly fight to secure those rights under the rule of law, since he believes that the securement of those rights would force us to rise to a whole new level of freedom. Where Locke and Rawls part ways, however, is on Rawls’ second principle of justice and its inherent conditions. Locke believes that humankind holds property in common as an entitlement from God and that individuals can acquire personal property from the commons through the advancement of their own labor. So, for this reason, Locke might agree with the idea of formal equality of opportunity, but he would not agree with Rawls entire difference principle. If everyone has a legitimate right to anything that they can acquire through toil, how does society prevent those that are stronger from subjecting and dominating those that are weaker? Although Locke would respond that an individual should never take more than what can be used out of the commons, the reality of this ideology is that it leaves too much open to the interpretation of less morally inclined men. Furthermore, it does not lend itself to the evening out of social starting places. As a matter of fact, Rawls might add that this would deepen injustice by creating an environment that is conducive to the further progression of disadvantage. So, although Locke’s alternative form of political justice would rank higher than Plato’s, it is still not as formidable as Rawls.

Our next deliberator, Immanuel Kant, possesses a doctrine that is the closest to Rawls, so therefore warrants a more in depth consideration. His conception of a civil society begins with equal and rational individuals giving their consent to be governed, by the rule of law, under the guise of moral reason. Kant states, “The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being.” (Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals) Kant additionally believes that reasonable persons would agree to form a unified whole under a lawful constitution which must be agreed to by the majority, and strive to secure basic equal liberty. So, since we need a majority agreement to enact our principles, we are forced to create laws that are universally accepted and that would further be acceptable to any member of the society as an ends. To explicate, a kingdom of ends, for Kant, is possible if everyone is treated as an end and never merely as a means. Kant states, “Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” (Kant, Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals) So, although the route that Kant takes might be a bit different from Rawls, the two outcomes are quite the same.

Kant also develops a notion of practical and theoretical reason that is akin to Rawls conception of considered judgment and reflexive equilibrium. Rawls believes that people have the capacity to reason from a universal standpoint, which means that they can make judgments from an impartial perspective. So for Rawls, considered judgments are those made with confidence when we are not upset and/or frightened, and when we have nothing to gain. Accordingly, they exemplify a sense of justice because they lack distortion. For Kant, pure reason provides the basis for both our moral motivation and our ability to make rational decisions. As such, his postulates of practical reason are necessities for moral and/or political action. For example, one postulate of Kant’s practical reason states that humans are free and able to develop concepts as well as to make choices that will allow them to realize those concepts. So, for Kant, the state of conscientiously preferring the moral law of duty is the only state that is good in and of itself. The only real difference here is that Rawls wishes to give content to practical reason while Kant strives to deduce morality from it.

An additional similarity appears between Rawls idea of public reason and Kant’s principle of the original contract. Rawls states, “that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statues, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact.” (Rawls, The Law of Peoples) According to Rawls, this conception of public reason is an imperative of democracy because it allows citizens to repudiate public officials that violate it, as well as hold them accountable to it. Additionally, Rawls deems this imperative to be a moral duty. In parallel, Kant discusses basic law coming only from the united will of all of the people. He states, “this requires no less than the will of the entire people (since all men decide for all men, and each decides for himself). For only towards oneself can one never act unjustly.” (Kant, “This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice”)

So, with all of these similarities, the question remains, where do Kant and Rawls differ, and where would they become unsuited in the original position? Their largest disagreement would arise in the ascribed inequality Kant formulates between the citizen and the statesmen. Kant believes that, although the freedom of expression is tantamount to justice, the right to rebellion is not. He additionally asserts that not every member of the commonwealth is entitled to participate in the creation of legislation, nor are they entitled to vote. It is clear that no delegate in the original position would give up these two basic rights while submitting themselves to another’s’ conceived rule of law. Rawls would consider both of these assertions to be deeply unjust, and in particular he would disavow Kant’s belief that all citizens should not be allowed to participate in an election, since this notion distinctly violates Rawls aim of social justice, which is maximizing the minimum magnitude of liberty.

In Sum, if Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Socrates, Locke, and Kant were situated as negotiators in the original position, none of their theories would be able to usurp Rawls two principles of justice. The common motivation for this is Rawls inclusion of the veil of ignorance, and its inherent ability to combine fair and unbiased debate with rational and disinterested decision-making. As such, it is important to recognize that Rawls conception of an egalitarian-liberal political philosophy reshaped the philosophical terrain by proposing that neither the liberal nor the egalitarian side was entirely correct in its assessments of justice. In so doing, he was able to formulate a theory that combined the best of both worlds, easing the tension between an individualistic outlook, and a communitarian belief. In this regard, if we are to rank the historical alternatives to Rawls from the least just to the most just, they would line up in the following way: Thrasymuchus, Socrates, Glaucon, Locke and Kant.