In Plato’s The Republic, Socrates’ argues that a just city-state is comprised solely of just individuals. Consequently, Socrates is able to define who a just individual is by first defining what a just city-state is, since in his viewpoint, it is impossible for a just city-state to be comprised of unjust souls. So, this begs the question, what is justice, and does justice imply the virtue of happiness? In answering this question, Socrates bases his conception of justice on the idea of a natural lottery; a notion in which all persons have inborn talent coupled with an obligation to perform his or her optimal function in the society dictated by this talent. For example, the optimal social function of persons born with high intelligence and appropriate education, is ruling the city-state. Likewise, for those that possess a high spirit, it is defending the city-state. The problem with this definition of justice, however, is that it does not take into consideration an individual’s free will or choice, and it additionally implies that justice denotes happiness. Although notions of individual civil liberty were not a part of the political dialogue in Plato’s day, when viewing his manifesto within a modern framework it is important to take these conceptions under consideration. In doing so, we can decide whether or not a paternalistic political system, crafted by this type of optimality, really does provide what is good and just to a contented people.

Within the confines of his conception of justice, Plato believes that the priority should not be to make one class of individual happy, but rather to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole. Since no human is entirely self-sufficient, he reasons, a community in which individuals do what they do best will provide every need for everybody in a highly efficient manner. However, the viability of this doctrine presupposes that the acquisition of basic needs is enough, and that, again, rationality does not encompass free will. Furthermore, if rationality does encompass free will, an assertion that remains debatable, Socrates believes that individuals will choose ethical obligation to the state over the satisfaction of personal preferences. However, do rational individuals freely give up their civil liberties in exchange for primary provisions? Regardless of the fact that free will is a modern conception, the basic core of what it is to be human would indicate a resounding no. The desire to be free and who we are is inherent in our basic composition. So, if agents are mainly self-interested, which do they choose? From Socrates’ point of view, since the ethics of rational agents stem from equal respect, rational agents who wish to promote their self-interest will choose to adhere the betterment of the commonwealth. As such, the concept of individual liberty remains unaddressed by Plato.

Continuing, since a just person is a person who has the same optimal divisions as the just city-state and is thus devoid of free will, a just person is able to avoid all psychic conflict. Although Plato thinks that each class of individual exists on a different level and inherently possesses different inborn ability, he also believes that the just individual is ruled by his own capacity to reason. This capacity to reason, regardless of how weak or strong, in a just individual will override all other appetites and spirits. I would argue, however, that this is not necessarily always the case. Self-interested individuals can behave irrationally and do possess intransitive preferences, and the fact that they behave irrationally does not make them unjust. Although this fact may unconsciously support Socrates argument for only allowing persons of high intelligence to become rulers, it does not support the reality of human thought and behavior, nor what defines happiness for all individuals.

So, upon further consideration, we must now decide on whether a just state is truly comprised of just individuals, and whether those just individuals are willing to sacrifice personal and/or familial interest in pursuit of political unity. By construing that these two entities are isomorphic, Socrates implies that individuals behave as institutions. The soundness of this argument is tenantable at best and remains largely unaddressed by Plato. By his logic, we can induce that the philosophers, who are the supreme beings of flawless justice, since they know and understand the form of the good, comprise the only part of the commonwealth that can truly be considered just. Why? Because they are the only persons endowed by the natural lottery with high intelligence and therefore the inherent ability to reason devoid of psychic conflict. So accordingly, shall we consider the city-state guided by these principals to truly be just? Or, is Socrates reasoning circular, or merely unrealistic?

By framing The Republic within the appropriate time and place, and not within the context of our modern definitions of goodness, justice, and happiness, we can gain insight into what Plato derives a just society to be. In doing so, we can use his guiding assumptions to explain why we should pursue philosophical inquiry as opposed to accepting human behavior for what it is. After all, was Socrates not a just and moral man condemned to die by his irrational peers? If we suspend our contemporary conceptions and adhere to the Utopia so craftily created by Socrates, The Republic can become a tutorial on the benefits of ethics as well as their sometimes-unintended consequences.