Feb
17
2010
Can Foundationalism and Coherence Theory Co-exist? Part Three
Please note that this is part three of a three-part discussion Significantly-built into the notion discussed in part two- is the concept that the inferential transmission of our justification does not need to be deductive, but rather can be probabilistic or inductive. Epistemologist Robert Audi, in The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy, states, “Superstructure beliefs may be only [...]
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Oct
20
2009
Can Foundationalism and Coherence Theory Co-exist? Part Two
Please note that this is part two of a three part discussion Empirical foundationalist Roderick Chisholm posits in The Myth of the Given that memory and perception are fallible and are some what a matter of coherence. Yet, he also thinks they belong to the class of justified basic beliefs. Why? Because we are human, [...]
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Oct
15
2009
Can Foundationalism and Coherence Theory Co-exist? Part One
Please note that this is part one of a three part discussion Foundationalism dictates that knowledge, in the form of justified true belief, must be grounded in immediately evident, or non-inferentially justified basic beliefs. It therefore condones a form of knowledge that is hierarchichal, with epistemic chains arising from these basic beliefs. Coherentism, on the [...]
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Feb
12
2009
Memory, Perception, and the A Priori define ‘The Given’
Some skeptical philosophers have wrongly characterized the class of basic beliefs in foundationalist theory known as ‘the given’ as a myth. In response, contemporary epistemologist Roderick Chisholm maintains that some beliefs can be self-justified independently, and that our other non-foundational beliefs, in turn, can be traced back to these basic beliefs. Yet, significantly, what does [...]
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Sep
18
2008
Epistemology: Should We Ascribe to a Cartesian Ideal?
The traditional conception of knowledge, originally subscribed to by Plato and forwarded by Descartes, has attempted to define knowledge by separating what constitutes genuine knowledge from what is mere opinion or groundless belief. This definition, which ultimately accepts knowledge to be justified true belief, is presently still being debated and analyzed. Contemporary deliberation on this [...]
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