Feb
12
2009
Memory, Perception, and the A Priori define ‘The Given’
Some skeptical philosophers have wrongly characterized the class of basic beliefs in foundationalist theory known as ‘the given’ as a myth. In response, contemporary epistemologist Roderick Chisholm maintains that some beliefs can be self-justified independently, and that our other non-foundational beliefs, in turn, can be traced back to these basic beliefs. Yet, significantly, what does [...]
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Feb
02
2009
Some Brief Thoughts on Schlick and Hilbert
Moritz Schlick, inspired by David Hilbert’s work, took the concept of separating epistemology from its intuitive content much further. Schlick asserts, “it seemed intolerable that the ultimate principals- the axioms of geometry, which underlie all proofs and therefore are not themselves provable-should still owe their validity to intuition alone.” (The Nature of Knowledge, pg. 32) [...]
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Dec
13
2008
Some Thoughts on Carnap
The language of Physics, a language that both reports and predicts, is an inherently empirical language that must also make an appeal to the unobservable . As such, within the realm of Physics, distinctions need be clarified between two types of terms; those that are observable, and those that are theoretical, and, consequently, between two [...]
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Dec
03
2008
Some Thoughts on Quine
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine critiques several attempts of defining the analyticity of synonnimity, definition, and semantical rules. His first observation is that the notion of synonnimity is in just as much need of definition as the concept of analyticity itself. Additionally, if we are to choose the concept of truth by definition, or [...]
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Dec
01
2008
Object Language V Metalanguage (my thoughts on the difference)
By the simplest of terms, the object language is the language of science, and the metalanguage is the language of the philosophy of science. In other words, the metalanguage discusses and describes the object language. For example, the proposition all ravens are black exists in the object language, whereas the proposition all ravens are black [...]
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Oct
29
2008
The Biology of Race Unraveled
Within the context of the current race debate, the question of whether race is a legitimate term rests on how we define it, and how, in turn, we deploy it. Can we use race to mandate a belief in biological determinism, or should we use it as a genetic surrogate to achieve equality? And, importantly, [...]
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Oct
23
2008
Richard Boyd and Natural Kind Terms
In Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds, Richard Boyd defends the use of cluster properties as natural kinds and natural kind terms, while refuting Ian Hackings claim that they are intrinsically social because they fail to satisfy the condition of being defined by a set of necessary and sufficient properties. While acknowledging that [...]
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Sep
24
2008
A Defense of Moral Naturalism
Making sense of our moral convictions can be a daunting task. As such, a squabble has long simmered on the origins of our moral norms, and whether or not our moral claims can be analyzed or reconciled to the natural world. Although the rival accounts have rarely quarreled over what constitutes right and wrong- since [...]
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